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Pedagogy and Critique: 
Values and Assumptions  
in the Law School Classroom 
RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL† 
An old joke has it that a rabbi, a minister, and a priest 
were out fishing when the weather took a sudden cooler 
turn. Without a word, the minister stepped out of the 
rowboat and walked across the water’s surface to retrieve 
his jacket from shore. A short while later, the rabbi made 
the same journey, returning to the boat sweater in tow. The 
priest—experiencing chills from the weather as well as from 
witnessing his colleagues’ seemingly miraculous if not 
entirely unprecedented feat—offered a silent prayer, 
stepped gingerly over the gunnel, and sank straight to the 
bottom of the lake. Whereupon the rabbi turned to the 
minister and said, “I guess we should have told him where 
the rocks are.” 
Jim Atleson’s Values and Assumptions in American 
Labor Law1—published just over a quarter century ago— 
set out to tell us where the rocks are in American labor law. 
Celebrated in a symposium hosted by the Baldy Center and 
 
† Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, 
University of Connecticut. Many thanks to the editors of the Buffalo Law 
Review for their extraordinary patience and for providing this virtual platform 
for my much-delayed contribution to the symposium discussed in this essay; to 
Fred Konefsky and Dianne Avery for their gracious hospitality during the live 
event; to Fred and Dianne as well as to Karl Klare, Jeremy Paul, Kerry Rittich, 
and Jack Schlegel for thoughtful and encouraging reactions to an earlier draft; 
and to Jim Atleson, whose scholarship, teaching, and mentoring have set the 
standard for a generation of progressive labor scholars. 
 1. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
(1983).  
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recently published in the Buffalo Law Review,2 the book was 
part of a larger “demystification” project—traceable to the 
legal realists and reinvigorated with a nigh Oedipal 
vengeance by scholars associated with critical legal studies 
(“cls”)—the aim of which was to explore what “really” goes 
on beneath the surface of doctrinal analysis and apology. 
Prior to cls—back when we were “all realists now”—the 
usual suspects were “policy” (per the Realist Lite line I 
heard in my own first-year law classes circa 1975) and the 
contents of the judge’s breakfast (in the dismissive sound-
byte version). But the Reloaded Realism of cls focused 
instead on ideology as the animating force in law and 
legality.  
Ironically, critical scholars took the pretensions of 
doctrine far more seriously than had earlier demystification 
efforts—not for nothing were we called the New 
Langdells3—carefully exploring all the talk of rules and 
exceptions, principles and policies, statutory language and 
structure, legislative history and purposes, etc. for traces of 
unexamined ideological commitments that might be 
surfaced in the service of critique. And nowhere was that 
effort more fruitful than in the law of the workplace, where 
—Jim’s cls-distancing disclaimers notwithstanding—Values 
and Assumptions took its place alongside the similarly 
groundbreaking efforts of Karl Klare and Jim’s late, greatly 
beloved colleague Alan Freeman.4  
A word or two about the crit-distancing. In the course of 
his remarks at the close of the live symposium, Jim was 
emphatic that Values and Assumptions was not a “critical 
legal study.” He struck a similar pose in the book itself, 
going out of his way to disassociate himself from the claims 
of his cls-identified contemporaries that the legal doctrine 
they were busy dismantling served “to make contingent 
 
 2. Symposium on James Atleson’s Values and Assumptions in American 
Labor Law, A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 629 
(2009) [hereinafter Symposium].  
 3. See Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence 
and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987). 
 4. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. 
L. REV. 1049 (1978); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act 
and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
265 (1978). 
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political and social choices seem inevitable or natural.”5 
(Been a long time since we’ve heard that line.) Yet in the 
same passage he pled guilty to “demystification”—
forthrightly acknowledging that his aim was “to unmask or 
decode labor law”6—and, whatever the author’s intentions, 
Values and Assumptions is a classic of the demystification 
genre, debunking legalist claims of doctrinal entailment to 
expose the ways in which judges and other legal decision 
makers reach contestable results despite their “just doin’ 
my job, ma’am” professions. Indeed, Jim’s comments at the 
symposium seemed to suggest that the reason for his 
dismay at being lumped together with his cls-identified 
contemporaries was not as much that he disagreed with 
their work as it was that the lumping offends his visceral 
contrarian streak, an attribute that for my money makes 
him more like other prominent first-generation crits rather 
than less. 
But Values and Assumptions did differ from 
contemporaneous critical scholarship in two important 
respects, and each of those differences may help account for 
the book’s enthusiastic reception among most labor law 
scholars, crit-distancing and otherwise. There was first 
Jim’s decision to put that felicitous appellation—“values 
and assumptions”—in lights, while relegating talk of 
“demystification” and “unmasking” to a footnote at the back 
of the book and avoiding altogether any reference to 
“deconstruction,” “trashing,” and other scary-sounding lingo 
of the sort one might have encountered in the Lizard, the 
official samizdat-style paper of cls for a brief period in the 
mid-1980s.7 “Values and assumptions” is an expression you 
can pretty safely take home to Mom, and attributing the 
disconnect between decidedly anti-labor Supreme Court 
opinions and the far more pro-labor statute they were 
purporting to interpret to “values and assumptions” went 
over far better in polite company than more muscular 
claims about decision making driven by “ideology” likely 
would have. 
 
 5. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 181 n.4; see also Dianne Avery & Alfred S. 
Konefsky, James B. Atleson and the World of Labor Law Scholarship, 57 BUFF. 
L. REV. 629, 639-41 (2009) (oral history quoting Atleson to the same effect).  
 6. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 181 n.4. 
 7. See generally Gary Minda, Remembering the Eighties: The Lizard Goes to 
the AALS, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1161 (2007). 
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This, I would argue, was more a rhetorical difference 
than one of substance, for the doctrine-trumping “values 
and assumptions” Jim famously uncovered—the “rocks” 
hidden beneath the surface of doctrinal profession—were 
profoundly ideological: that “the continuity of production 
must be maintained” (and the statutory right to strike thus 
narrowly circumscribed); that “employees, unless controlled, 
will act irresponsibly” (whereas employers could be trusted 
not to exploit the privileges and loopholes of labor law); that 
employees—much like the servants of nineteenth-century 
common law—owed a non-reciprocal duty of “respect and 
deference” to their masters that “need not be earned but, 
rather, was implicit in the employment relationship”; that 
employees were merely guests in the workplace and their 
statutory rights thus had to “compete with shadowy notions 
about employer ownership”; and finally that employees 
could play only a subservient role in workplace governance 
because a full and genuine partnership would interfere with 
the “inherent and exclusive managerial rights of 
employers.”8 Referring to these notions as “values and 
assumptions”—rather than, say, as the Five Pillars of 
Capitalist Oppression—softened the blow of what was 
otherwise a deeply convention-challenging account of 
American labor law. 
Jim’s book departed from what was widely assumed to 
be cls orthodoxy in a second respect (and don’t get me 
started on the causes and consequences of this assumption). 
Referring to the patterns of thought he exposed and 
critiqued as “values and assumptions” avoided the 
suggestion that legal decision making is the product of some 
sort of ruling class conspiracy, leaving open the kinder and 
gentler possibility that judges are among the mystified 
rather than the mystifiers. To be sure, most 
contemporaneous cls work took as its starting point a 
critique rather than an embrace of such “vulgar Marxist” 
notions (in the formulation used by many early crits, doing 
some distancing of their own) and explored a considerably 
more complex relationship between ideology and law than 
what was (and still is) frequently attributed to scholars 
associated with cls. And in retrospect Jim’s shorthand 
phrase may have erred in the opposite direction, suggesting 
as it did a benign dynamic of individual rather than social 
 
 8. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 7-9.  
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provenance; who among us, after all, doesn’t have values 
and assumptions? But it was far more difficult for 
mainstream academics to dismiss an account of judicial 
decision making based on unexamined “values and 
assumptions” than it would have been had Jim ascribed the 
dynamic he so astutely unveiled to one big capitalist plot. 
At all events, the principal reason for the book’s 
continuing influence and nigh iconic status in our field is 
that its basic point was undeniably right. To mention just a 
few from the long list of labor law decisions scrutinized in 
Values and Assumptions, there’s the famous dictum from 
Mackay Radio9 (now routinely treated as law) that 
employers may permanently replace strikers despite a 
provision in the National Labor Relations Act declaring that 
“[n]othing in this [Act] shall be construed so as to interfere 
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to 
strike[;]”10 there’s the holding in First National 
Maintenance11 that employers may cease operations without 
consulting the union representing their employees despite a 
statutory provision requiring collective bargaining over 
decisions affecting “rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of employment[;]”12 and 
there’s the holding in Gateway Coal13 that employers may 
punish employees who refuse to work for fear of abnormally 
dangerous conditions unless the refusing employees 
establish not only their “good faith”14—as required by the 
language of the statute—but also the objective accuracy of 
their assessment under a judicially improvised requirement 
that the feared conditions “actually obtain.”15 
As Jim convincingly demonstrated,16 decisions like these 
are far more plausibly attributable to extra-legal 
commitments—however conscious and whatever we call 
 
 9. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). 
 10. National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
 11. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-86 (1981). 
 12. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006). 
 13. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). 
 14. Labor Management Relations Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (2006). 
 15. Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 386. 
 16. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 19-34 (discussing Mackay Radio), 111-35 
(discussing First National Maintenance), 97-107 (discussing Gateway Coal).  
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them—than to the supposed entailments of legal reasoning. 
And as the papers in the published symposium authored by 
an impressive line-up of contemporary labor scholars and 
practitioners attest, that core insight continues to guide 
progressive work in the labor law field to this day.17 
* * * * * 
I want to focus the remainder of my essay on a related 
but distinct legacy of Values and Assumptions—on the role 
it played in the teaching of labor law during the decade or 
two following its publication. Until I re-read the book in 
preparation for the live symposium, I had forgotten that it 
begins with a story about an incident in a labor law class 
Jim taught early in his career. A puzzled student—reacting 
to decisions like those recounted a moment ago—asked why 
courts kept ignoring employee rights that were “clearly and 
unequivocally set out in the National Labor Relations Act” 
in favor of limitations that were “neither discussed in the 
legislative debates and reports nor expressed in the 
statute.”18 Jim described the St. Paul moment that the 
question inspired thus: 
I began patiently to answer with the verities I had been taught, 
that no statute or right is absolute and that all rights had to be 
balanced against competing interests. I could not continue. 
Suddenly, the traditional dogma no longer made sense. Removing 
blinders does not, in itself, create understanding. This book is an 
attempt to answer the question.
19
 
In Jim’s characteristically modest account, then, a student 
is the source of the question that . . . well, killed 
conventional legal studies, and the initial audience for Jim’s 
attempt to grapple with it was a law school class. 
Jim thus “broke the seal” between frequently 
dichotomous dimensions of legal academia—teaching and 
scholarship—and in this he was not alone. My own 
introduction to first-generation cls work was Duncan 
Kennedy’s Contracts course in the fall of 1975, and his 
seminal critical legal study—Form and Substance in Private 
 
 17. See Symposium, supra note 2. 
 18. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 1. 
 19. Id. 
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Law Adjudication20—came out the following summer and 
provided a virtual roadmap of that unforgettable class. Karl 
Klare was likewise bringing critical scholarship to the 
classroom and critical pedagogy to his writing—his 
Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook21 is a 
classic of the genre—and his success in doing so was 
confirmed when the American Lawyer (at the time an 
upstart publication seeking to become the Rolling Stone of a 
profession otherwise extremely short on rock stars and 
exposés) featured Karl and fellow traveler Roberto Unger 
among a handful of the most popular and promising young 
law professors in the U.S. 
In retrospect, I think that a crucial link between critical 
teaching and critical scholarship was the demystification 
project. Law students—accustomed as they were to Socratic 
and exam experiences that all too frequently produced the 
sensation of drowning in the conventional legal materials—
were eager to learn “where the rocks are.” And for a 
complex mix of reasons—to humanize the exercise of 
professorial power, to avenge the injustices of our own 
student experiences, and most of all to produce lawyers 
better equipped to negotiate the terrain of legal analysis 
and argument—scholars associated with cls were eager to 
help students find their footing. 
In an homage to such efforts by our own teachers, many 
of us who entered the legal academy in the 1980s focused 
our early publications on classroom exercises and 
experiences: Jamie Boyle’s The Anatomy of a Torts Class22 
and Jenni Jaff’s Frame-Shifting: An Empowering 
Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning23 
come quickly to mind, as does Jeremy Paul’s A Bedtime 
Story, an engaging account of a child’s dispute with his 
babysitter that has demonstrated to legions of beginning 
students that they come to law school more familiar than 
 
 20. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
 21. Karl E. Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979) (book review). 
 22. James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 
(1985). 
 23. Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching 
and Learning Legal Reasoning, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1986). 
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they’d ever imagined with the arguments routinely deployed 
by American lawyers and judges.24 And my own “fifteen 
minutes of fame” arrived when a classroom hypothetical—
included in an essay about cls and designed to prompt my 
labor law students to think critically about why it is that 
profits follow capital rather than labor—was reprinted in 
the “Week in Review” section of the New York Times under 
the caption “What the Fuss Is About.”25 
* * * * * 
Values and Assumptions was published in 1983, the 
year I left practice for teaching. I devoured the book in a 
single sitting, sorry only that I hadn’t read it before I began 
my half-decade as an appellate lawyer for the National 
Labor Relations Board—where, like the priest in the 
rowboat, for want of a map I had plunged into the abyss on 
more than one occasion. Determined that things would be 
different for my own students, I assigned the book as 
required reading for my labor law class that year and for 
many years after. 
Early on, Values and Assumptions was a major hit with 
the student audience. Naturally, it held the most appeal for 
left-progressives who came to law school with a basic faith 
in law as an instrument of social justice but didn’t much 
like most of the law they were encountering in their classes. 
For them, the book’s account of benevolent legislative 
commands repeatedly subverted by unspoken judicial 
“values and assumptions” rendered the many adverse 
decisions lawless and illegitimate, producing the 
exhilarating experience of seeing the emperor without 
clothes.  
The conservatives found themselves exhilarated in a 
different way: “Of course we should privilege uninterrupted 
production and employer property rights,” they would 
argue, a little nervous about the methodology (none dared 
call it judicial activism) but delighted to learn that at least 
something stood between private enterprise and what they 
 
 24. Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915 (1988). 
 25. The hypothetical can be found in Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism 
About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505, 527-28 (1987) and the 
Times version at Jennifer A. Kingson, Harvard Tenure Battle Puts ‘Critical 
Legal Studies’ on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1987, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6. 
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perceived to be the liberal excesses of the Labor Act and the 
NLRB. 
The political moderates—meaning most of my students 
—didn’t experience the exhilaration but nevertheless came 
away from the book and our discussions of it sobered by 
what they processed as the “anti-labor bias” of American 
courts. Moreover, they were grateful for the powerful tool 
that the “values and assumptions” analysis gave them for 
organizing and understanding the voluminous course 
materials; indeed, before “legal theory” developed a bad 
name in student circles, this was a view that seemed to be 
shared by my students of every political stripe. 
As the years passed, however, class discussions and 
exam-grading revealed that my students were increasingly 
relying on sound-byte versions of the book’s rich and 
nuanced arguments, many of them reading only the 
introductory chapter (which conveniently listed the 
previously mentioned Five Pillars) or a student digest of 
same. The exhilaration that Values and Assumptions had at 
one time generated gave way to increasingly rote and 
stultified analyses, and at some point in the mid-1990s I 
stopped assigning the book as required reading. 
A number of factors, I think, had led to the diminished 
efficacy of “values and assumptions” analysis in my 
classroom. For one thing, I had myself begun to move on to 
other interests in the labor law field. I found that I greatly 
enjoyed teaching the intricacies of secondary boycott and 
recognitional picketing law—topics that Jim’s book hadn’t 
covered—and began devoting more class time to those topics 
each year. Moreover, as a result of my involvement in the 
1990s with an international network of progressive labor 
law scholars and practitioners (Intell), I began to emphasize 
international and comparative labor issues and also to 
question the conventional boundaries of the field by 
exploring immigration, poverty law, and work/family 
conflict issues that had not previously been on my radar. 
Likewise, I eagerly reconfigured my course to explore the 
new organizing strategies developed by the labor movement 
in the last decade and a half—strategies that rely less on 
NLRB protection and enforcement and more on collective 
self-help (thus increasing the importance of the limits on 
secondary boycotts and recognitional picketing) as well as 
recourse to areas of work law that lie beyond the reach of 
the Labor Act (such as employment discrimination law, 
FLSA, and OSHA). As a result, many of the topics covered 
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in Values and Assumptions loomed less and less large in my 
labor courses. 
A second factor related to a generational shift in the 
experiences and understandings that my students were 
bringing to class—a shift revealed to me by an exercise I 
conduct each year on the first day of class, when I ask each 
student to write out a brief explanation of the basis for her 
interest in the course and to state whether she or any 
member of her family has ever belonged to a labor union. 
When I started teaching at the University of Miami in 1983, 
a large majority of my students responded affirmatively to 
the latter query, many reporting first-hand experiences in a 
unionized workplace. (That may seem surprising given that 
Florida is a right-to-work state, but public sector unions 
were and still are relatively robust there, and for a variety 
of reasons an influx of police officers and public school 
teachers were pursuing law degrees at Miami in the early 
1980s. During that period there was likewise a substantial 
cohort of former and soon-to-be former unionized employees 
of South Florida-based airlines at various stages of 
bankruptcy). By contrast, in a class I taught in the spring of 
2000, not one of the students reported either first-hand or 
familial union experience, reflecting the steep decline in 
union density that had occurred in Florida and most 
everywhere else since the early 1980s. As a result, my 
principal challenge in teaching the labor law course was no 
longer accounting for the anti-union skew of judicial 
decision making but was instead helping my students to 
understand just what a union is and why anyone would 
want one. 
I undertook a variety of strategies to fill that gap, at 
first assigning books like John Hoerr’s account of the long 
and successful organizing campaign among the support staff 
at Harvard University26 and Jonathan Rosenblum’s account 
of the ill-fated Arizona copper strike of 1983.27 Those books 
got some traction with students, but eventually I found far 
greater success when I started showing classic labor films 
(such as Bread & Roses, Matewan, and Norma Rae) that 
bring the experience of organizing to life for a generation 
 
 26. JOHN HOERR, WE CAN’T EAT PRESTIGE: THE WOMEN WHO ORGANIZED 
HARVARD (1997). 
 27. JONATHAN D. ROSENBLUM, COPPER CRUCIBLE: HOW THE ARIZONA MINERS’ 
STRIKE OF 1983 RECAST LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN AMERICA (1995). 
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seemingly more in the thrall of films than of books—or 
perhaps merely more comfortable with their ability to 
analyze the former than the latter in the presence of a book-
loving law professor. Reference to such films has 
considerably enriched and enlivened class discussion, and 
perhaps at some point I’ll have the courage and the energy 
to follow the lead of gifted classroom teachers like Roberto 
Corrada and Marion Crain and permit my students to 
unionize and engage in collective bargaining with me over 
the terms and conditions of the labor law course—an 
exercise that by all accounts brings the virtues as well as 
the challenges of collective action and representation home 
to students in a manner unmatched by even the most 
compelling film.28 
* * * * * 
But perhaps the most important reason that Values and 
Assumptions had lost its “kick” in my classroom was that I 
was relying too much on the book to get its core message 
across to my students—and don’t doubt for a moment that 
the message is as important to labor lawyers today as it was 
in 1983. In recent years, I have thus attempted to provoke 
my students into experiencing Jim’s St. Paul moment on 
their own and have had considerable success by deploying 
the following exercise when we study Lechmere, Inc. v. 
NLRB,29 the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision permitting an 
employer to bar union organizers from soliciting support or 
distributing literature in the employee area of a shopping 
center parking lot or indeed anywhere else on its property.30 
Here, verbatim, is the opening sentence of the Lechmere 
opinion: 
This case requires us to clarify the relationship between the rights 
of employees under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA 
 
 28. See, e.g., Roberto L. Corrada, A Simulation of Union Organizing in a 
Labor Law Class, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 445 (1996). 
 29. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 30. For particularly illuminating analyses of the property access issue, see 
Dianne Avery, Federal Labor Rights and Access to Private Property: The NLRB 
and the Right to Exclude, 11 IND. REL. L.J. 145 (1989); Cynthia L. Estlund, 
Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994).  
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or Act), 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and the 
property rights of their employers.
31
 
And here is the question I put to my students when I ask 
them to read the case in preparation for class: If you were a 
legal research and writing instructor at an American law 
school, and the foregoing line appeared in a student paper, 
what would you do with your red pen? 
When the next class convenes, I can count on at least 
one of my more meticulous students to point out that we’re 
missing a legal citation—that the sentence in question 
introduces two sets of rights, those of employees and those 
of employers, but that only the former is accompanied by 
the required reference to authoritative legal materials. I am 
invariably tempted to follow up that response by asking 
what employees have to do to secure rights (a) that require 
no citation and (b) that win the way that employer rights do 
in Lechmere, but time permitting I slow things down and 
use the response as a springboard to the following 
discussion. 
Let’s give the Court a hand and provide the missing 
citation. What is it? Silence. Is it in the Labor Act? Mass 
shuffling of pages in the statutory supplement but 
otherwise continued silence. Does the Court tell us elsewhere 
in its opinion? More shuffling and more silence as—mirabile 
dictu—neither source yields an answer. 
If no one has figured out the game at this point, I 
typically pose my next question: Well, where do property 
rights usually come from? I’ll sometimes add a “From God?” 
and then riff a bit on the Baltimore Catechism, but someone 
will eventually force me back on track and respond that 
state common law is ordinarily the source of property 
rights. And that prompts my next question: If employer 
property rights come from state common law, what should 
happen when they conflict with federal statutory rights? 
Quite a few students are able to respond to this one by 
referring to the rock-paper-scissors hierarchy of legal 
authority: statutes trump common law and federal law 
trumps state law, so federal statutory rights should handily 
play scissors to the paper of state common law. So why, I 
then ask, did just the opposite happen here? 
 
 31. 502 U.S. at 529. 
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This frequently leads to a useful digression about 
whether the rock of the U.S. Constitution might be 
responsible for breaking the federal statutory scissors in 
Lechmere—i.e., whether a statute interpreted to give union 
organizers access to the public areas of privately owned 
shopping centers might constitute a “taking” under the 
Fifth Amendment—but this line of reasoning doesn’t get us 
very far, since (a) if the Supreme Court meant to declare a 
reading of the Labor Act constitutionally infirm it would 
almost surely have come right out and said so32 and (b) the 
Court’s decision in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins33—
rejecting a “takings” challenge to a California state court 
decision granting free speech rights to individuals in public 
areas of shopping centers—pretty strongly suggests that a 
grant of such access to labor organizers under federal law 
wouldn’t constitute a “taking” either. 
So I continue: Let’s assume that the Court is right and 
that, when it comes to union organizing, state common law 
property rights do trump federal statutory rights. If that’s 
the case, what result if Lechmere arose in California? 
Someone eventually figures out that the employer might 
have a difficult time, since after Pruneyard California 
employers don’t enjoy a state property law right to bar 
shopping center access for individuals engaged in expressive 
activities. Can this possibly be what Congress intended—
that in each case the NLRB is required to examine the 
particulars of local property law and that employee statutory 
rights will turn on the results of that inquiry? Is this a 
plausible reading of the National Labor Relations Act? I 
don’t tell them at this point that the NLRB has adopted 
precisely that interpretation of Lechmere and thus looks to 
state law in order to determine whether the employer in a 
particular case in fact has a right to limit union access to 
the property in question34—an approach that makes perfect 
sense until you think about it for ten seconds. (To be sure, I 
like the Board’s results, which tend to be far more favorable 
to organizer access claims than the common law that 
conservative Supreme Court Justices think they remember 
from law school. But as a method of interpreting a federal 
 
 32. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (no such luck). 
 33. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 34. See, e.g., Farm Fresh, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 1424, 1425-26 (2000); Bristol 
Farms, Inc. 311 N.L.R.B. 437, 439 (1993). 
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statute, this is absurd—although, like most instances of 
reductio ad absurdum, the problem lies in the premise, in 
this case the Supreme Court’s assumption that common law 
property rights limit employee rights under the Labor Act.) 
So isn’t this really a question of statutory interpretation? 
If employer common law property rights are to come into 
play, isn’t it because Congress intended them to trump or 
limit employee rights under the Labor Act? Is there anything 
in the statute to support that claim? Murmuring and more 
shuffling of books and papers. Does the opinion tie this point 
to legislative history? Ditto. 
Until eventually a student ventures: “Well, I think the 
Court just assumed that property rights weren’t displaced 
by the Labor Act.” Bingo, and now we can begin. 
